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1. Introduction  
 
Over the past decade average student test score performance in mathematics, science 
and reading among Swedish students has declined to a level below the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average. This was presented in 
the 2012 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) report that was 
published on December 3rd 2013.0F1 PISA is an international student assessment that 
measures 15-year-old students’ performance in mathematics, science and reading. The 
PISA report also revealed that more than one fourth of Sweden’s students do not 
reach the minimum criterion of performance in mathematics. This negative trend can 
be observed in both public and private schools, regardless of gender, age and other 
socio-economic factors. There are 34 OECD countries and Sweden was ranked #28 in 
mathematics, and #27 in both reading and science. Mathematic test scores declined in 
the other Nordic countries too between the years 2003 and 2012, but not as much as in 
Sweden. This negative trend has led to huge debates in Sweden concerning how to 
react to the poor student test scores and teachers have a lot to say in this matter since 
they are in daily contact with the students. The poor student test scores are of severe 
concern as education is the key to economic growth. The most important goal of 
education is that it generates future income or at least income capacity. Some studies 
show that there is a correlation between teacher compensation and student 
achievement. Neal (2011) provides evidence that when teachers in Arkansas were 
given bonuses based on students’ improvements on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills, the 
students improved in all subjects tested. One possibility of improving the Swedish 
PISA results and the overall student performance could therefore be to change the 
ways in which teachers are compensated. But before a change can be implemented it 
is important to consider the opinions of the teachers. In the schools where 
performance-related pay has been introduced the opinions of the teachers have not 
explicitly been considered. Instead, its effects on student test scores have been the 
main focus. This is problematic as an introduction of performance-related pay 
essentially affects the teachers. I decided to let teachers around Sweden answer a 
survey regarding their attitudes towards introducing performance-related pay in the 
teaching profession to gain understanding of the target group, the teachers. What 
factors affect teachers’ willingness to be compensated based on performance? After 
approximately 250 emails sent to teachers at both primary schools and high schools, 
58 teachers decided to participate in the study. The main findings are that 
approximately 67 percent of the respondents would be willing to be compensated 
based on performance and approximately 90 percent of the respondents do not believe 
that their salary corresponds to the teaching activities that they do. It was also found 
that women are on average less satisfied with wages than men.  
The limitations to the study are that the sample is relatively small, and 
although the results obtained in this small sample could be seen as a good indicator of 
what Swedish teachers believe, one must still be aware of that the intended 
respondents decided for themselves whether or not they wanted to participate in the 
study. This means that some teacher groups might not be represented; only a few 
teachers at private schools answered the survey for example. Furthermore, the survey 
1 OECD (2013) “PISA 2012 Results In Focus” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-overview.pdf 
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was sent out in English, which increases the risk of Swedish teachers interpreting the 
survey questions incorrectly.  
In performance-related pay, economic theory and actual practice sometimes 
seems inconsistent (Fryer, 2011, Lazear, 2000). The challenge to economists is to 
provide explanations to why the models in Personnel Economics sometimes do not 
correlate with reality. I believe that we have to acquire knowledge about what 
characterizes the teachers who would be willing to be compensated based on 
performance. 
This study is organized as follows: In the first part of the thesis a background 
to why the research question was chosen will be presented. In the second part, 
previous studies and works examining performance-related pay will be discussed. 
Both a theoretical and an empirical review of the academic works written will be 
presented. Finally, in the third part of the thesis, my original contribution will be 
presented; the data collection, method used and the survey results will be discussed.  
 
2. Background  
 
In this section I briefly discuss teachers’ impact on student performance in order to 
give the reader an understanding of why it is of value to consider the teachers’ 
opinions when trying to improve student test scores. 
 
2.1 Pisa Report and the Factors Affecting Student Performance  
 
The OECD published a report in February 2014 concerning the 2012 PISA results and 
this section is to a great extent based on this report.1F2 The purpose of the report was to 
reveal the underlying factors to the poor student test scores and compare policies and 
methods used for learning across schools in Sweden and in comparison to other 
OECD countries. In the report, it is presented that teachers’ wages are relatively low 
in Sweden compared to the country’s general wealth. By contrast, high-performing 
countries tend to prioritize higher salaries for teachers. Swedish secondary teachers 
are only paid 92 percent of Sweden’s per capita GDP. This could be compared to 
Korea where teachers are paid approximately 182 percent of its per capita GDP. 
Interestingly enough, Korean students are the highest performing students among 
students in the OECD countries. Furthermore, in most other OECD countries teachers 
are paid more than 100 percent of per capita GDP. This suggests that there might be a 
correlation between teacher compensation and student performance.  
An interesting discussion is conducted in the review “Teacher Incentives” 
where Lazear (2003) examines the compensation contracts of teachers in Sweden as 
well as in the United States and finds that in both countries the salaries of teachers are 
very low and the wage differentials among teachers are small. Low pay means that 
fewer people are likely to become teachers, this leads to lower quality among 
teachers, since talented workers might decide not to become teachers. Paying based 
on student achievement will benefit those teachers who have the greatest ability to 
influence student test scores. This will attract those who have the ability and 
discourage those who have not. A reason to introduce performance-related pay could 
2 OECD (2014) “Resources, policies and practices in Sweden’s schooling system: an in-depth analysis 
of PISA 2012 results” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/23/42/93/11ed5f6d.pdf  
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therefore be to solve the problems of low teacher quality and poor student test scores 
(Lazear, 2003). Although, there might be many factors influencing student 
achievement, it cannot be denied that the fact that teacher salaries are low in Sweden 
might be one explanation to why the test scores of Swedish students are declining. 
The fact that teachers in Korea are the best paid and have the highest performing 
students supports this point (OECD, 2014).  
Moreover, looking at other factors such as class size, the report shows that the 
Swedish class sizes are smaller than in other OECD countries. However, there is a 
weak relationship between class size and student achievement. This was presented in 
the OECD’s report published in 2014.2F3 Furthermore, Swedish schools have on 
average the same level of educational resources as other OECD countries but the 
resources are not shared equally between Swedish schools. The availability of 
educational resources including textbooks, computer software and internet connection 
is clearly correlated with student performance. This means that less fortunate schools 
are more likely to show poor student test scores. However, this relationship has not, 
interestingly enough, shown to be present in high-performing countries including 
Korea and the Netherlands.  
 
2.2 Personnel Economics 
 
In this section Personnel Economics will briefly be discussed. This branch of 
economics contains theories that explain optimal ways for workers to be compensated 
including performance-related pay which is the main focus of my study.  
 
The main task in Personnel Economics is to study the interaction between employers 
and workers. By using a mathematical approach, one is able to come up with the 
employee’s optimal compensation contract that make the worker exert the optimal 
level of effort and that maximizes the firm’s profit. Employers and workers have 
different interests: worker effort leads to benefits to the firm and costs to the worker. 
However, both parties can benefit from trade if the workers are compensated for their 
cost of effort. Personnel Economics has been developed because traditional 
Production Theory does not say anything about how wages should be structured in 
order to motivate workers. In the standard model of compensation, workers are paid 
the competitive wage but it is not defined in what structure or form the competitive 
wage is given (Lazear, 1995). This is problematic as optimal wage contracts differ 
depending on what type of job is considered. Teaching differs from other professions 
since teachers often experience a lot of intrinsic motivation. This means that teacher 
motivation is often based on non-financial rewards rather than on financial rewards. 
Since teachers do not receive high wages this aspect of motivation is vital; 
psychological rewards play a major role and factors such as student learning and a 
genuine interest in the topic in which they teach become more important.  
 
 
3 OECD (2014) “Resources, policies and practices in Sweden’s schooling system: an in-depth analysis 
of PISA 2012 results” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/23/42/93/11ed5f6d.pdf 
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2.3 Job Satisfaction  
In this section job satisfaction is briefly discussed. Adams’ Equity Theory of 1963 
states that if employees believe that there is an imbalance between inputs and outputs 
they get de-motivated. In other words, if the compensation received does not 
correspond to worker skills and hours spent on the job they won’t experience job 
satisfaction. Job satisfaction among teachers has been shown to be correlated with the 
level of compensation that the teachers’ receive and is therefore closely connected to 
my research question that aims to investigate teachers’ willingness to be compensated 
based on performance. Ingersoll and Smith (2003) show that high levels of turnover 
and dissatisfaction are due to low teacher wages. Moreover, Darling-Hammond 
(2003) shows that job satisfaction has a positive effect on teachers’ effectiveness, 
which in turn improves student performance. She shows that skilled, well-prepared 
and satisfied teachers have the greatest positive influence on student learning and 
achievement.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
In this section the existing studies on performance-related pay, which are closely 
related to my research question are discussed. More specifically, in section 3.1 the 
theoretical contributions on performance-related pay are presented. Special attention 
is given to the analysis conducted by Edward Lazear, who is considered to be one of 
the founders of Personnel Economics. In section 3.2, previous empirical studies 
focusing on performance-related pay will be considered. Both studies on where 
performance-related pay has had positive and negative effects on teacher and student 
performance will be brought up. 
 
3.1 Review of Theoretical Papers 
 
In this section, the economic models on why performance-related pay would work in 
theory are presented. It is often discussed if fixed or variable pay should be used when 
compensating workers. A fixed pay compensates the worker independently of the 
output (s)he produces and with variable pay the worker is compensated through an 
output-based measure of performance (Lazear, 1995). The most commonly used form 
of variable pay is the piece rate pay, which is a form of performance-related pay. For 
a compensation contract to be optimal it must make the worker exert the efficient 
level of effort so that the firm profit maximizes (Lazear, 1995). Lazear (1995) shows 
that if a piece rate scheme is used the worker will be paid according to the following 
equation: 
𝑤 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦 
 
Where α is equal to the base salary, β is equal to the piece rate received per unit of 
output and 𝑦 is equal to the output that the worker produces. In the model, it is 
assumed that effort is equal to output (𝑒 = 𝑦). This means that the measurement of 
effort is assumed to be perfect. The worker also acquires a cost of effort, which is 
represented by 𝐶(𝑒).  
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The optimal effort level is therefore the solution to the maximization problem of the 
worker’s supply function subject to the effort level 𝑒: 
 
𝛼 + 𝛽𝑒 −  𝐶 (𝑒) 
 
With first-order condition 𝐶’(𝑒) = 𝛽. This tells us that the effort level that the worker 
exerts increases as the piece rate increases. In order for the worker to take the job, the 
wage has to exceed the cost of effort; this is represented by the following expression: 
 
𝛼 + 𝛽𝑒 > 𝐶(𝑒) 
 
One question that is often addressed is whether workers should be paid based on input 
or output. The factor that has to be considered is the measurement cost; it is easier to 
obtain a measure for input than it is for output (Lazear, 1995). Output is measured at 
cost Γ and the firm will choose to pay wages based on input instead of output when 
the cost of measurement of the worker’s output is high or requires a long time. For 
teachers, payment based on input, would be payment based on time worked and set of 
skills obtained. Payment based on output would refer to some metric of student 
achievement (Lazear, 2003). The role of risk-aversion also has to be considered; the 
risk-averse worker will prefer the straight salary based on input to the piece rate since 
the straight salary provides complete insurance to the worker. It might lead to a lower 
wage for the worker in total but for a risk-averse worker this might still be preferred. 
If the firm pays wages according to a piece rate system the total wage of the worker 
can either be low because (s)he has experienced a lot of bad luck or because (s)he has 
not put in sufficient amount of effort into the job. The trade-off between quantity and 
quality must also be considered. It can be argued that paying workers based on output 
produced will lead to high numbers of low-quality units produced. However, it can 
also be argued that a worker who is compensated based on input is in theory 
indifferent between spending all his/her time on one unit or on producing many 
(Lazear, 1995).  
A problem with introducing piece rates is what is commonly called the 
“Ratchet effect”, where hard-working workers in the first period might signal that the 
task is easier than what the average worker thinks. This might lead to that the firm 
lowers the piece rate. If the workers are aware of this they might reduce the effort 
level in the first period and in this way face a higher piece rate than they deserve in 
the second period. In other words, the workers have incentives to keep output in 
period 1 lower than efficient. 
  Despite some of the problems concerning piece rates, it can be argued that 
they are necessary because the marginal cost of additional effort exerted increases 
𝐶′(𝑒) > 0 at an increasing rate 𝐶′′(𝑒) > 0. This is illustrated in figure 1 below where 
𝐶(𝑒) represents the cost of effort and 𝑒 represents the effort level. 
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Figure 1: The marginal cost of effort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The worker will put in more effort as long as the marginal return (additional wages 
received for every unit of effort) is greater than the marginal cost of effort. In other 
words, if 𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑒
> 0 the worker will exert more effort as it will increase his/her utility. 
However, if 𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑒
< 0 effort decreases utility and the worker will choose not to work. 
 
 If a worker is paid straight salary according to the following equation: 
 
𝑈(𝑤, 𝑒) = 𝛼 − 𝐶(𝑒) 
 
The worker will maximize utility when effort is equal to zero (𝑒 = 0) as the salary α 
is independent of effort; this is shown in figure 2 below. The straight vertical line 
represents the compensation contract, which in this case is the fixed wage level 𝛼, and 
𝑈 represents the utility function.  
 
 Figure 2: Effort exerted under a fixed wage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At 𝑒 = 0 the worker reaches the highest utility function (s)he can reach given the 
compensation contract. If the firm wants the worker to exert effort the firm has to pay 
the worker more for every additional unit of effort exerted as every unit of effort 
increases the worker’s cost of effort at an increasing rate. In figure 3 below, it is 
shown how an introduction of a piece rate system increases the amount of effort that 
the worker is willing to exert. The straight vertical line still represents the fixed wage 
level 𝛼 and the line 𝛽𝑒 represents the additional wage that the worker receives if the 
piece rate system is introduced. The piece rate system makes the worker exert the 
optimal level of effort 𝑒 ∗. 
  C(e)                                                                       e                                       
                     w                                U                                                                                 𝛼                                                                                     e 
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Figure 3: Effort exerted under a piece rate system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
  
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, in figure 4 below, the two linear lines 𝛽1𝑒 and 𝛽2𝑒 represent two 
different compensation contracts given under a piece rate system. The piece rate 𝛽2 is 
greater than the piece rate 𝛽1. It is shown that the worker’s choice of effort increases 
from 𝑒1 to 𝑒2 when the firm increases the piece rate from 𝛽1 to 𝛽2. 
 
Figure 4:Two different piece rate systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another thing that has to be considered is the worker’s participation constraint. The 
worker will pick the point where 𝛽 = 𝐶′(𝑒) as long as the utility that it obtains by 
doing this exceeds the utility it gets from an outside option. This means that U (w, e) 
has to be greater than Ū, where Ū represents the utility the worker gets from an 
outside option. In the theory of Personnel Economics, it is often assumed, for 
simplicity, that the cost of effort is equal to 𝐶
2
 𝑒2. The first-order condition of the cost 
of effort subject to effort is therefore 𝐶(𝑒) and 𝛽 = 𝐶(𝑒) is therefore the worker’s 
utility maximizing choice. The worker will in other words maximize utility by picking 
the point where effort equals 𝛽
𝐶
. This equation 𝑒 ∗= 𝛽
𝐶
 represents the workers incentive 
compatibility constraint. The two constraints: participation constraint and incentive 
compatibility constraint must be satisfied in order for the firm to profit maximize and 
the worker to exert the optimal level of effort. The utility function therefore looks like 
this: 
 
𝑈 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑒 −  𝐶2  𝑒2 
 
  w                              U    𝛽𝑒                                      
𝛼                                                 e                       e*                                                                                                                             
       w                                   U                                          𝛽2𝑒                                                                                𝛽1𝑒      α                                                                                                                                                                      e               e1          e2                                     
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Substituting 𝑒 ∗ into the equation gives us: 
 
𝑈 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 �𝛽
𝑐
� −  𝐶
2
 �𝛽
𝐶
�
2
 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2
2𝐶
 
 
 In order for the participation constraint to be satisfied 𝑈 ≥ Ū:  
 
𝛼 + 𝛽22𝐶 ≥ Ū 
 
The firm’s problem is to: 
1.) Choose fixed salary 𝛼 to ensure that the worker’s participation constraint is 
satisfied. 
2.) Choose piece rate 𝛽 to induce the worker to exert the profit-maximizing amount of 
effort. 
 
The firm’s profit function is represented by the following equation: 
 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑦 − 𝑤 
 
Where 𝑝 represents the price of the firm’s product. Still assuming perfect 
measurement of effort (𝑒 = 𝑦) this equation can be rewritten as follows: 
 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑒 − 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑒 = (𝑃 − 𝛽) 𝑒 − 𝛼 
 
Since the firm’s profit decreases in 𝛼, the firm will set the base salary as low as 
possible but so that the worker still chooses to participate. This is shown by the 
following equation: 
 
𝛼 ≥ Ū −
𝛽22𝐶 
 
The firm will set the base salary 𝛼 equal to Ū − 𝛽
2
2𝐶
. The base salary will not affect 
effort level chosen; it is set to ensure that the worker is willing to participate.  
Substituting 𝑒 ∗ and 𝛼 into the firm’s profit function we get the following expression: 
 
π = (p − β)𝛽
𝐶
− Ū + 𝛽22𝐶 
 
If we simplify this expression we get: 
 
𝜋 = 𝑃𝛽
𝐶
−
𝛽22𝐶 − Ū 
 
The firm will maximize profits subject to the piece rate 𝛽 and we get the following 
first-order condition: 
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𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝛽
= 𝑝
𝑐
−
𝛽
𝑐
 
In order to maximize profits the firm sets 𝛽 = 𝑝. Where the piece rate equals the price 
of the product sold.  
In theory, introducing performance-related pay incentivizes the worker to 
exert the optimal level of effort that leads to that the firm profit maximizes. However, 
the empirical findings show different results; some show evidence of that 
performance-related pay improves student achievement and some show that it has no 
significant impact on it. According to me, the goal should be to identify what 
categorizes the group of teachers that are positive to the idea of being compensated 
based on performance before we implement it.  
 
3.2 Review of Empirical Papers 
 
The studies discussed in this section provide mixed evidence, some show that the 
introduction of performance-related pay has had positive impacts on student 
achievement at the different schools, while other do not find any significant effect. In 
the first group of studies, it is not clear what typifies the schools at which the 
introduction of performance-related pay has had positive effects, and it is not 
discussed what characterizes the group of teachers that responded positively to being 
compensated based on performance. 
 
i. Positive relationship between performance-related pay and student performance 
 
Let us start with the studies that find a positive relationship between performance-
related pay and student achievement. Neal (2011) provides evidence that teachers 
respond positively to performance-related pay. In Arkansas, teachers were given 
bonuses based on students’ improvements on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills. Language, 
mathematics and reading skills were tested and the results show that students 
improved in all subjects.  
Fryer et al. (2012) performed the first field experiment of teacher incentives 
where loss aversion is taken into account and finds evidence that framing a teacher 
financial incentive program in terms of losses instead of gains improves student 
achievement. Between the years 2010 and 2011 an experiment in nine low-
performing schools in Chicago Heights was operated.  Teachers were randomly 
picked out to participate in the financial incentive program. The teachers got awarded 
in two different ways. There was one gain treatment group where the teachers 
received financial incentives in the form of bonuses at a maximum of 8000 dollars. 
This was based on student achievement and was distributed in the end of the year. 
Also, there was one loss treatment group where a lump sum of 4000 dollars bonus 
was distributed to the teachers in the beginning of the school year. The teachers were 
told that they got to keep the bonus if the students met the performance goals. If 
student performance was below the target they had to return the difference between 
4000 dollars and the bonus they actually earned. If the student results were above 
average however, an additional payment of up to 4000 dollars was awarded.  In both 
groups, the maximum bonus possible was therefore the same. There were two 
different gain and loss treatment groups: one team and individual treatment group. In 
the individual treatment groups, the teachers got awarded based on their own 
students’ test scores and in the team treatment groups the teachers got awarded 
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according to the average team performance. 150 out of 160 teachers that were eligible 
to participate decided to take part in the field experiment. Teachers were compensated 
based on the students’ end of year test scores on the ThinkLink Predictive 
Assessment. In the case where students had teachers who were part of the loss 
treatment group there were statistically significant improvements in student 
achievement. For the gain treatment, mostly insignificant results were found. 
However, the null hypothesis that gain and loss treatments have the same impact on 
mathematics test scores could be rejected with at least 95 percent certainty. Our 
interpretation is that loss aversion might play an important role in implementing 
financial incentives for teachers.  
In addition, Lavy (2009) also presents evidence that performance-related pay 
might have a positive impact on student test scores. His study was done in Israel 
where high school teachers received monetary bonuses based on how their classes 
performed on matriculation exams in mathematics and English. Teachers received 
monetary bonuses if they managed to improve student test scores. However, since the 
experiment took place during one year’s time, the long-term effects are not known. 
But in the short-run the bonus system had more students take the matriculation exams 
and both the pass rates and the average student test scores increased. 
ii. Negative relationship between performance-related pay and student performance 
 
When it comes to performance-related pay, economic theory and actual practice 
sometimes seems inconsistent. In this section empirical evidence that goes against the 
traditional economic theories of Personnel Economics is presented. Fryer (2011) finds 
no evidence that incentivizing teachers increases student achievement when he 
performs a randomized trial in approximately 200 schools to see if there is a 
correlation. In 2007, financial incentives were provided to teachers in the lowest 
performing public schools in New York City to improve student attendance and 
achievement. 400 schools participated in the two-year pilot program. Middle schools 
and high schools were selected based on the average scores on the tests in fourth to 
eighth grade. Elementary schools were selected based on demographics including 
special education students and poverty rates. The sample in the first year consisted of 
198 treatment schools and 163 control schools. The schools received a lump-sum 
bonus of 3000 dollars for every union-represented staff member if the school met the 
annual performance goal set by the Department of Education. The basis for awarding 
incentives to the teachers was the progress report card score, which consisted of 
different categories including learning environment, student performance, and student 
progress. The student progress depended on the average changes in the test scores and 
the percentage of students that at the state test for elementary and middle schools 
made at least one year of progress. Schools were incentivized relative to how other 
schools performed. In the first year 104 schools in the treatment group got the full 
bonus as they met the progress target and 18 schools met 75 percent of the progress 
target and received half of the bonus. In the second year, only 191 out of 198 schools 
in the treatment group decided to take part in the incentive program and 154 of these 
received full bonus while seven schools received half of the maximum bonus. Despite 
these results, Fryer (2011) shows that providing teachers with financial incentives did 
not increase the student result in any statistically meaningful way.  
Furthermore, Lazear (2000) encounters something interesting when he 
investigates the introduction of a team incentive scheme in the petrol industry. He 
finds that the productivity increased by more than 12 percent over 6 months when 
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British Petrol and Exploration introduced a team incentive scheme to incentivize 
workers. Monthly output was measured and based on the team output; bonuses were 
given to the workers. However, when British Petrol and Exploration tried the same 
thing at the head office it was not appreciated; workers quit and hated it. How do we 
know when to introduce performance-related pay and not? I believe that we have to 
look at people as individuals and acquire knowledge about the workers who would be 
willing to be compensated based on performance. 
 
iii. The consequences of introducing performance-related pay 
 
In this section the possible problems with introducing performance-related pay will be 
considered. Despite the fact that performance-related pay in some cases seems to have 
positive effects on student achievement we have to be aware of its limitations 
including negative incentives and its effect on intrinsic motivation. There is a 
monitoring problem too as the education authorities cannot observe the majority of 
teachers’ actions. Performance-related pay focuses on incentivizing actions and if 
these actions are linked to student achievement problems including negative 
incentives, can arise. Teachers might take actions that increase the measured student 
achievement relative to the students’ true level of knowledge. Performance-related 
pay has a tendency to invite cheating actions that lead to higher bonuses when in fact, 
teacher performance and/or student achievement have not changed (Neal, 2011).  
Chakrabarti et al. (2013) also show that implementing school policies might 
have negative consequences. In the paper, the Florida Opportunity Scholarship 
Program featured a policy that made it possible for students at low-performing 
schools to move to higher-performing schools. Students received vouchers that made 
it possible for them to move to high-performing schools if their school got two failing 
marks within four years. For a school, this meant that if students moved, the school 
would lose revenue and the transfers would lead to undesirable attention. In the study, 
various forms of strategic behavioral patterns were found including suspension of 
weak students during exam periods, putting weak students into special education 
groups and teacher cheating. Marks were based on the Florida Comprehensive 
Assessment Test. The school was given a failing mark if the students did not achieve 
the minimum criteria in the subjects of writing, reading and mathematics. If the 
school received two failing marks within four years, all students were given the 
chance to transfer to a different school. Test scores from students with limited English 
language knowledge were excluded from the sample as well as students in special 
education groups.  As these two groups were excluded, teachers had incentives to 
reclassify weak students into one of these two groups, thus lower the risk of getting a 
failing mark. Using data from the Florida Department of Education, Chakrabarti et al. 
(2013) found evidence that threatened schools that had received one failing mark 
already, reclassified a greater extent of their students into the excluded groups than 
schools who were not threatened. And there is no evidence of that the threatened and 
non-threatened schools behaved differently before the Florida Opportunity 
Scholarship Program was implemented. This shows that negative incentives might 
occur when school policies are implemented as the policies might lead to strategic 
reclassification and improved test scores that are not due to genuine improvements.  
Furthermore, teachers tend to be driven by intrinsic motivation. Since 
performance-related pay focuses on extrinsic benefits these might crowd-out intrinsic 
motivation. Teachers that felt like they were doing something important for the 
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society without getting high rewards and benefited from coming across as a nice 
person might decrease the amount of effort put in when paid higher wages. 
 
4. Research question 
 
In trying to answer the research question regarding if Swedish teachers would be 
willing to be compensated based on performance I prepared a survey that was 
administered online for teachers at different schools around Sweden to answer. The 
survey focused on how teachers perceive the possibility of being compensated based 
on performance in their profession. Studies have shown a positive relationship 
between teacher compensation and student achievement (Neal, 2011, Fryer et al., 
2012, Lavy 2009) but the teachers' views on performance-related pay have seldom 
been emphasized. Instead, its effects on test scores have been the main focus. Since an 
introduction of performance-related pay would mainly affect the teachers I thought it 
would be of value to investigate the factors that affect teachers’ willingness to be 
compensated based on performance. Furthermore, it has been shown that 
dissatisfaction is often due to low salaries (Ingersoll and Smith, 2003), but equally so 
in this area, teachers have been seen as a group instead of investigating the individual 
characteristics of those who experience job dissatisfaction. Since part of the questions 
in the survey revealed the teachers’ demographic characteristics, it was possible to 
investigate if the answers differed depending on factors including gender, age, level 
of education and experience. In other words, the survey questions asked made it 
possible to see if certain factors increased the probability of teachers being positive 
towards introducing performance-related pay or if they increased the probability of 
teachers experiencing job satisfaction. Are men and women equally satisfied with 
wages? Are younger people generally more dissatisfied with wages than older 
teachers? By trying to answer these questions the dissatisfied teachers can be 
identified. In order for changes to occur we need to gain more understanding of the 
target group, the teachers. However, it is not just the teachers' opinions that should be 
considered. It is also important to investigate how the students feel about the 
declining test scores and the reasons for it. I would like to see these kinds of studies in 
the future. 
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5. Context of the study 
 
In this section, aspects of the Swedish educational system are discussed. The 
information is taken from Lärarförbundets website. 3F4 Lärarförbundet is a union for 
teachers of all categories. The Swedish school system ranges from pre-school to adult 
education. Pre-school classes are voluntary, while nine years primary education is 
compulsory. Upper secondary education is three years and voluntary. The Education 
Act provides a framework for all school activities where goals and guidelines are 
stated. Municipalities, counties and the state organize education in Sweden but the 
municipalities have the main responsibility. In addition, private schools can be 
accepted to operate if they get permission from the municipality where the school is 
going to be conducted. Every school in Sweden has a principal that is in charge of the 
management and the coordination of the educational work. As a teacher in Sweden, 
one either works with children, adolescents or adult learning. Teachers are responsible 
for preparing lessons and for grading students. Teaching is carried out in pre-schools, 
primary schools, at leisure centers, in secondary- and adult education. Schools can be 
either private or public and teachers can be on either on-going contracts or on fixed-
term contracts. Since December 2013 it is required that teachers acquire teacher 
certification for permanent employment. In the certification, it is defined at what type 
of schools that the teacher is qualified to teach at and which topics the teacher is 
qualified to teach in. Moreover, teachers' salaries are set individually at every school. 
There are no agreed entrance salaries that are set in any collective agreements.  
 
6. Data 
 
In this section details about the data collected, the procedure and the measures used 
are presented.  
 
6.1 Data Collection 
 
i. Participants 
After approximately 250 emails sent over 8 days (April 23rd to April 30th) to teachers 
at both primary schools and high schools, 58 teachers decided to participate in the 
study. The characteristics of the participants can be seen in table 1, containing 
information about gender, highest level of formal education completed, the teacher’s 
employment status, the type of contract that the teachers are on, whether the teachers 
work at private or public schools, age, and how long the teachers have worked in the 
teaching profession on average. It is important to have in mind that this study is not 
based on a representative sample. Few teachers from private schools answered the 
survey; as a consequence, it was not possible to base the analysis on if the teachers 
work at public or private schools.  
 
 
 
 
4 Lärarförbundet, (2014-05-20) [Online]. Available: https://www.lararforbundet.se/ 
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Table 1: Information about the participants 
Gender Women 64% Men 36%   
Education 
completed 
Gymnasium 10% Bachelor 
degree 37% 
Master’s 
degree 44% 
PhD 8% 
Employment 
status 
Full-time 71% Part-time 29%   
Type of contract On-going 
contract 65% 
Fixed-term 
contract 35% 
  
Public/private Public schools 
97% 
Private schools 
3% 
  
Age Mean: 45 years Std dev. ±13,6 
years 
  
Years in the 
teaching 
profession 
Mean: 16 years Std dev. ±12,7 
years. 
  
 
ii. Procedure 
The survey was administered online and concerned teachers’ views on performance-
related pay and job satisfaction. The teachers received an email with a description of 
the study and a link to the survey, which was administered using Google Drive’s 
survey form (see Appendix 2). The teachers were ensured that all information that was 
collected in the study would be treated confidentially and that the results would be 
made available using grouping criteria with guarantee that their school and their 
personnel would not be identifiable in any report of the results of the study. The 
advantages of using a web survey were that it was a quick and cheap method of data 
collection as the responses were recorded directly in the submission of the survey. 
The disadvantages however, were the risk of loss of responses due to technical 
problems and the risk of limited access to internet among the intended participants. 
Furthermore, the survey was sent out in English, which increased the risk of Swedish 
teachers misinterpreting the questions or choosing not to participate in the survey. 
iii. Measures 
All information reported in the study is based on Swedish teachers’ views on the 
educational system. In times of downward trends in student performance it is 
important to examine what the people in the school system consider to be the causes 
of it to get a deeper understanding of the problem. With this said, it would be 
interesting to compare these results to other approaches including: the students’ 
opinions about the Swedish school system and the declining student test scores in the 
2012 PISA report. Furthermore, it would be noteworthy to compare the Swedish 
teachers’ survey answers to teachers in other OECD countries. 
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6.2 Data content 
 
The survey consisted of a total of 30 questions divided as follows: 14 questions 
concerning personal information, 4 questions regarding school variables, 3 questions 
on appraisal/feedback, 15 questions concerning job satisfaction, 8 questions regarding 
teachers’ opinions about the teaching profession and one final open question on the 
teachers’ views on the poor student test scores in the 2012 PISA report. Moreover, 
some of the questions included were taken from the following surveys: Teacher 
Questionnaire4F5 and Job Satisfaction Questionnaire5F6. None of the questions were 
compulsory; teachers were free to skip questions if they wanted to. However, 
approximately 69 percent of the teachers answered all of the questions.  
 
In the part concerning personal information, the following questions were asked: 
 
Table 2: Questions concerning personal information 
Personal information 
Gender                                                                                                         Female/Male 
Birth year                                                          The year when the respondent was born                                                     
Place of birth                                                                                        City and Country 
Education            Highest level of formal education that the respondent has completed 
Degree                                                                  Year when last degree was completed 
Years            Number of years at the school where the respondent is currently working 
Teacher experience                                      Number of years in the teaching profession 
Monthly wage                                                                        Net monthly wage in SEK 
School(s)                              Number of schools that the respondent currently works in 
Employment status                                                                            Full-time/Part-time 
Type of contract                                                Fixed-term contract/ On-going contract  
Classes                                                Number of classes that the respondent teaches in 
Class size                        Number of students in the classes where the respondent teach 
Subject(s)                                                         Subject(s) that the respondent teaches in 
(See Appendix 2 for detailed questions asked) 
 
The questions on personal information were added to give a demographic aspect to 
the study. The questions give a measure of the proportions and dimensions of the 
respondents and make it possible to see if the answers vary depending on group 
belonging. And if so, to what extent it has an impact on the willingness to being 
compensated based on performance-related pay and the level of job satisfaction in 
salary.  
 
 
 
5 OECD Teaching and Learning International Survey (2014-04-19) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/43081362.pdf  6 Job Satisfaction Questionnaire (2014-04-19) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.salisbury.edu/search.html?cx=012922190682254864109%3Ax5_7wzea6la&cof=FORID%
3A11&q=job+satisfaction&sa=Search 
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The school variable section consisted of the following variables: 
 
Table 3: Questions concerning school variables 
School variables 
Type of school                                                                     Primary school/ high school 
School information                                                                                    Public/private 
School achievement                                                                             High/middle/ low 
School performance                                           High-/average-/low-performing school 
Ethnic constellation of students Proportion of Swedish, other Europeans, African-American, 
Hispanic-Latino, Middle East and other students 
(See Appendix 2 for detailed questions asked) 
 
The school variable questions were added to investigate if the respondent believes 
that his/her school contributes to the downward trend in test scores or not. Moreover, 
the question on type of school was added to see whether or not it has an effect on job 
satisfaction in salary. Moreover, the questions on appraisal and feedback have to do 
with how often the teacher gets feedback from the principal, colleagues and students 
and what aspects that are considered to be important when the appraisal/feedback is 
given. It is also asked if the appraisal/feedback has lead to any changes or 
improvements. These questions were added as, in my opinion, this is a topic that is 
rarely discussed in Sweden. 
 
The questions on job satisfaction ask the teacher to rate how satisfied (s)he is with the 
following aspects of his/her job situation:  
 
Table 4: Questions concerning job satisfaction 
Job satisfaction 
Hours worked                           
Flexibility in scheduling          
Location of work                      
Salary                                        
Promotion                                
Opportunities                            
Benefits                                     
Job security                               
Recognition                              
Relationship with co-workers  
Relationship with supervisor    
Use of skills                              
Job training                               
Variety in responsibilities         
Independency                            
 (See Appendix 2 for detailed questions asked) 
 
For all questions on job satisfaction the rating system 1-5 (whole numbers) was used 
(1=not satisfied at all, 5= extremely satisfied). The job satisfaction questions were 
included, as higher levels of teacher job satisfaction have been found to have positive 
effects on student achievement (Darling-Hammond, 2003).  
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Furthermore, the questions regarding teachers’ opinions about the teaching profession 
consisted of the following statements:  
 
Table 5: Questions concerning teachers’ opinions 
Teacher compensation corresponds to teacher performance in Sweden 
If teacher compensation would increase I would put more effort into my job 
There is a correlation between teacher compensation and student achievement  
In teaching, non-financial motivation is stronger than financial motivation 
Increasing teacher wages would improve teacher quality 
I would be more motivated to teach if teacher compensation was to increase 
(See Appendix 2 for detailed questions asked) 
 
The respondents were asked to what extent they agree with what is written. To their 
aid they had the following scale: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Agree and 4.  
Strongly agree. How the teachers stand in these statements are important as they are a 
good indicator of if performance-related pay would be an effective way of 
compensating teachers.   
 
7. Analysis 
 
In trying to answer the research question it was first investigated whether or not 
teachers are satisfied with the salary they get. This aspect of job satisfaction is the 
basis to whether or not a change in the ways that teachers are compensated is 
required. If the case is that teachers are generally satisfied with wages, changing the 
ways in which teachers are compensated might not be the best way of trying to solve 
the problem of declining student test scores. To investigate this, I considered a 
regression where job satisfaction in salary was used as the dependent variable and 
gender, birth year, education, teacher experience, type of school that the teacher 
works in, monthly wage, employment status, and type of contract were used as the 
independent variables. The independent variables were chosen because in trying to 
investigate level of job satisfaction in salary in the teaching profession it is important 
to find out what it is that characterizes the teachers that are dissatisfied. Not all 
variables concerning personal information were added in the regression, the variable 
place of birth was not added, as it does not necessarily say anything about where the 
teacher currently works. The variable degree, which tells us when the teacher 
completed his/her last degree was not included in the regression as it is highly 
correlated with number of years in the teaching profession. Most people start working 
quite quickly after graduating. Furthermore, the variable years which tells us how 
long the teacher has worked at the school where (s)he currently works was not added 
since it is more interesting to look at number of total years in the teaching profession. 
In regression 1, an ordered logistic model was used, in this model, larger values are 
assumed to correspond to higher levels of job satisfaction in salary. The ordered logit 
model is based on the cumulative probability that the respondent experiences job 
satisfaction in the higher category. Which in my regression means that the respondent 
experiences a level of job satisfaction that is higher than the middle value of the 
ranking system. In other words, a level of job satisfaction in salary that is higher than 
2.5. The values that are part of the higher category are therefore 3-5. For one unit 
increase in the independent variable the probability for that the respondent 
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experiences job satisfaction in salary in the higher category is expected to change by 
its respective regression estimate in percent.  
 
Table 6: Names and descriptions of the variables used in regression 1 
Variables                                                                                         Description 
Dependent variables 
Job satisfaction in salary                                Binary variable=1-5, 1=not satisfied at all, 5=extremely satisfied  
Independent variables 
Gender                                                                      Binary variable=1 if female, 0 if male   
Birth year                                                               The year when the respondent was born 
Education          Binary variable=1 if high school/gymnasium, 2 if bachelor, 3 if master and 4 if PhD      
Teacher experience                                           Number of years in the teaching profession 
Type of school                                           Binary variable=1 if primary school, 2 if high school 
Monthly wage                                                                            Net monthly wage in SEK 
Employment status                                          Binary variable=1 if full-time, 0 if part-time 
Type of contract                  Binary variable=1 if fixed-term contract, 0 if on-going contract 
 
In regression 2, the probit model was used and the estimates of the independent 
variables should be interpreted as marginal effects. The teacher’s view on 
performance-related pay was used as the dependent variable. This, as it is the focus of 
the study and the main reason for the research. In order to start compensating teachers 
based on performance one needs to find out if it is a change that the teachers are 
willing to go through. The independent variables that were used are gender, birth 
year, whether or not the respondent believes that teacher compensation corresponds to 
teacher performance, monthly wage, employment status, education, and teacher 
experience. The justification to why these independent variables were chosen is to see 
whether or not women, whom to a greater extent are subject to wage discrimination 
would be more willing to being compensated based on performance. Furthermore, the 
variable birth year was included in the regression to see whether or not the view on 
performance-related pay varies among younger and older teachers. Moreover, the 
variable that tells us whether or not the respondent believes that teacher compensation 
corresponds to teacher performance is added to see whether or not teachers that do not 
think that compensation resembles performance are more positive towards 
performance-related pay. The variable monthly wage was added to investigate 
whether or not teachers with lower wages are more willing to being compensated 
based on performance-related pay than those with higher wages. Finally, the variables 
of employment status, education, and teacher experience were added to see whether 
or not the willingness to being compensated based on performance vary depending on 
if the respondent works full-time/part-time, what kind of formal education the 
respondent attains and how many years the respondent has worked as a teacher. 
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Table 7: Names and descriptions of the variables used in regression 2 
Variables                                                      Description 
Dependent variables 
Performance related-pay                                           Binary variable=1 if positive, 0 if negative  
Independent variables 
Gender                                                                              Binary variable=1 if female, 0 if male        
Birth year                                                                 The year when the respondent was born 
Teacher compensation              Whether or not teachers believe that teacher compensation corresponds 
to teacher performance. Binary variable 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree    
Monthly wage                                                                                                    Net monthly wage in SEK 
Employment status                                                 Binary variable=1 if full-time, 0 if part-time 
Education            Binary variable=1 if high school/gymnasium, 2 if bachelor, 3 if master and 4 if PhD 
Teacher experience                                                  Number of years in the teaching profession 
 
In table 8, summary statistics for the variables in the regressions where it is of value 
to account for mean, standard deviation and minimum/ maximum values are reported: 
 
Table 8: Summary statistics  
Variable   Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Regression 
Job satisfaction 
salary  
57 2.193          1.025           1             5 1             
Performance-
related pay  
57 0.737           0.444            0   1 2 
Birth year 57 1969.175     13.692       1947 1991 1,2 
Teacher experience 51 16.784         12.926          1 44 1,2 
Monthly wage 54 19965.74          4409.401     6000 30300 1,2 
 
In table 8, the mean wage 19965.74 SEK is lower than the 2013 Swedish average 
monthly wage for public and private sector teachers reported by SCB.6F7 According to 
SCB’s data, a primary school teacher earns 27 000 SEK a month. It is debatable 
whether my data is representative of what teachers earn, and it is perhaps not 
surprising that most of the teachers are dissatisfied with their wages when the average 
for the sample is lower than the national average. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 contain histograms over the distribution of ranking in job satisfaction 
in salary and teacher compensation respectively. In figure 5, it appears that 39 percent 
of the respondents rated their level of job satisfaction in salary to a level of 2, which 
tells that the respondents are relatively dissatisfied with the wages they receive. 
Approximately 30 percent of the respondents rated their level of job satisfaction in 
salary to 1 and only one person rated his/her level of job satisfaction to a level of 5. It 
is clear that among the respondents participating in the study, the level of job 
satisfaction in salary is low.  
 
 
7 Statistiska Centralbyrån (2014-05-24) [Online]. Available: http://www.scb.se/sv_/Hitta-
statistik/Statistik-efter-amne/Arbetsmarknad/Loner-och-arbetskostnader/Lonestrukturstatistik-privat-
sektor-SLP/7531/7538/Tjansteman-2012/28201/ 
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Figure 5: Distribution of job satisfaction in salary 
 
  
Note: The y-axis represents the rating system for job satisfaction in salary 1-5, 1=not satisfied at all, 
5= extremely satisfied. The x-axis shows the number of respondents that rated in each category. 
 
However, one should be aware of that overall job satisfaction is a result of many 
different components and in this study only job satisfaction in salary is highlighted as 
it is the component of job satisfaction that is the closest connected to my research 
question. In figure 6, it can be seen how the respondents answered on the survey 
statement “Teacher compensation corresponds to teacher performance in Sweden". 
Out of 58 respondents, 47 percent strongly disagreed, 32 percent disagreed and 21 
percent agreed with the statement. In other words, the majority of the respondents do 
not believe that teacher compensation corresponds to teacher performance.  
 
Figure 6: The respondents’ views on teacher compensation 
 
                      
 
  
Note: The y-axis shows the different answer choices for the statement and the x-axis shows the number 
of respondents that replied in the different categories. 
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In figure 7, it can be seen that out of 58 respondents, approximately 67 percent would 
be willing to be compensated based on performance. 
 
Figure 7: Performance-related pay 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 8, it can be seen that approximately 90 percent of the respondents believe 
that teacher compensation does not correspond to the teaching activities that they do. 
Comparing this result to the result in figure 7, we see that although 90 percent of the 
respondents are dissatisfied with the compensation they receive, not all of them would 
be willing to be compensated based on performance. 
 
Figure 8: Teacher compensation corresponds to teaching activities  
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In table 9, the correlations between the variables that were presented in figures 5, 6, 7, 
and 8 are listed. As can be seen, performance-related pay and whether or not the 
respondent believes that teacher compensation corresponds to teaching activities 
correlate negatively. Most of the respondents that do not think that teacher 
compensation corresponds to teaching activities would be willing to be compensated 
based on performance. Moreover, as job satisfaction in salary goes up, the probability 
of being positive to performance-related pay goes down. 
 
 
Table 9: Correlation matrix  
 Job satisfaction in salary 
Teacher 
compensation 
Performance-
related pay 
Teacher 
compensation 
corresponds to 
teaching activities 
Job satisfaction in salary 1.00    
Teacher compensation 0.075 1.00   
Performance-related pay -0.101 0.146 1.00  
Teacher compensation 
corresponds to teaching 
activities 
0.223 -0.045 -0.467 1.00 
 
8. Results 
 
In regression 1 the ordered logit model was used to estimate the respondents job 
satisfaction in salary. For one unit increase in the independent variable the probability 
for that the respondent experiences job satisfaction in the higher category is expected 
to change by its respective regression estimate in percent.  
In regression 2, the probit model was used, and the outcome variable could 
only take two different values:(1/0): yes or no. The estimates of the independent 
variables should be interpreted as marginal effects. For one unit increase in the 
independent variable the probit regression estimate gives the change in the probability 
of the respondents being positive to an introduction of performance-related pay in 
percent. In tables 10 and 11, stars are used as indicators of the significance levels of 
the different estimates. Heteroscedastic probit models can sometimes be difficult to 
estimate. I failed to test for heteroscedasticity for all variables at the same time but as 
a next best solution the variables in the probit model were tested for heteroscedasticity 
separately. For all of the variables included in regression 2 the null hypothesis that the 
variables are heteroscedastic could be dismissed. However, it is uncertain whether this 
way of testing for heteroscedasticity is as reliable as when all variables are tested for 
it simultaneously. Moreover, for the ordered logit model, STATA could not converge 
any results on if the variables included in regression 1 are heteroscedastic. It would be 
problematic if the variables are heteroscedastic and the fact that we do not know 
makes the study less reliable. For all variables in regressions 1 and 2 correlation 
matrices were done in STATA to see to what extent the variables are correlated with 
each other. This was done in order to be able to detect the possibility of 
multicollinearity. Since the given correlations for all of the included variables were 
below 0.43, the concern of existing multicollinearity could be dismissed for both 
regressions.  
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8.1 Job satisfaction in salary 
 
In equation 1 below, 𝑌𝑖 is the observed ordinal variable for job satisfaction in salary 
that takes on whole numbers 1 through 5. The marginal effects of the different 
dependent variables on job satisfaction in salary can be seen in table 10.  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
𝛽5𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                      
 
Table 10: Results for regression 1  
(Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parenthesis) 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent 
variable 
 Job satisfaction in 
salary 
 
Independent 
variables 
   
Gender −1.590* (0.847) −1.739* (0.891) −1.833* (0.922) 
Birth year 0.039 (0.055) 0.413 (0.056) 0.043 (0.056) 
Education 0.154 (0.436) −0.202 (0.541) −0.114 (0.582) 
Teacher experience −0.010 (0.072) −0.023 (0.074) −0.019 (0.075) 
Type of school −1.351 (1.179) −1.227 (1.171) −1.308 (1.205) 
Monthly wage - 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
Employment status - - −0.103 (0.844) 
Type of contract - - −0.372 (0.794) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance levels 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively 
 
In model 1, the 𝑅2 for the regression is 0.075. This means that 7.5 percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables. 
The estimate gender shows that if the respondent is a female and all other independent 
variables are held constant the ordered logit for females being in a higher category for 
job satisfaction in salary is 159 percent less than for men. Which means that on 
average women are less satisfied than men. This is significant on the 10 percent level. 
The estimate birth year shows that a unit increase in birth year increases the 
probability of job satisfaction in salary being in a higher category with 3.9 percent. 
This is however, not a significant result. The fact that a unit increase in education 
increases the probability of job satisfaction in salary being in a higher category with 
15.4 percent and that teacher experience decreases the probability with 1 percent per 
unit increase in experience is not significant either. The ordered logit for teachers 
working in a high school rather than in a primary school decreases the probability of 
job satisfaction in salary being in a higher category with 135.1 percent, but this is not 
a significant result.  
Furthermore, in model 2, where the independent variable monthly wage was 
added to the equation, it can be seen that the estimates are relatively unchanged. The 
estimate gender is slightly larger but it is still significant on the 10 percent level. The 
estimate for education shows, in contrast to model 1, that a unit increase in education 
has a negative impact on the probability of that the respondent experiences job 
satisfaction in salary. This result is however not significant. Furthermore, a unit 
increase in monthly wage (1 SEK) increases the probability of a teacher being 
satisfied with his/her salary with 0.01 percent.  
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Moreover, in model 3, the variables employment status and type of contract 
were added to the equation, the result we get is an even greater negative value for 
females being in a higher category for job satisfaction in salary than men. This result 
is significant on the 10 percent level. Otherwise, the estimates are similar to the ones 
in model 1. In addition, the estimates for employment status and type of contract 
show that the ordered logit for teachers working full-time and working under a fixed-
term contract being in a higher category for job satisfaction in salary is 10.3 percent 
and 37.2 percent less than for teachers that work part-time and work under an on-
going contract respectively.  
 
8.2 Performance-related pay  
 
In equation 2, the factors that influence whether teachers are willing to be 
compensated based on performance or not were investigated. In the analysis the probit 
model was used and the dependent variable could only take on two values:(1/0): yes 
or no. The independent variables used were: gender, birth year, whether or not 
teachers think that teacher compensation corresponds to teacher performance, 
monthly wage, employment status, education and teacher experience. The estimates 
that are presented in table 11 are the marginal effects calculated with the probit 
model.  
 Pr (Performancerelatedpay) = Pr(𝑌 = 1) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝛽4𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                             
 
Table 11: Results for regression 2 
(Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parenthesis) 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable  Performance-related 
pay 
 
Independent variables    
Constant −53.091 (45.173) −52.709 (44.747) 9.650 (84.545) 
Gender −0.067 (0.520) −0.455 (0.526) −0.261 (0.653) 
Birth year 0.029 (0.023) 0.029 (0.023) −0.003 (0.043) 
Compensation appropriate  0.914** (0.406) 0.878**(0.408) 1.446** (0.601) 
Monthly wage −0.0003***(0.00009) −0.0003***(0.00009) −0.0003***(0.0001) 
Employment status - −0.326 (0.699) - 
Education - - 1.039** (0.467) 
Teacher experience - - −0.003 (0.048) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance levels 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively 
 
In model 1, the 𝑅2 value of the regression is 0.356. It can be seen that a unit increase 
in the degree to which teachers believe that compensation corresponds to teacher 
performance increases the probability of the teacher being positive to performance-
related pay with 91.4 percent. This is significant on the 5 percent level. One unit 
increase in monthly wage (1 SEK) decreases the probability of a teacher being 
positive towards performance-related pay with 0.03 percent. This is significant on the 
1 percent level.  Moreover, if the respondent is a female the probability of being 
positive towards being compensated based on performance decreases with 6.7 
percent. This is however, not a significant result. Furthermore, a unit increase in birth 
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year increases the probability of the respondent being positive towards performance-
related pay with 2.9 percent. These results are however, not significant.  
In model 2, the variable employment status was added to the equation, this 
leads to that the negative impact on the probability of the respondent being positive 
towards performance-related pay if the teacher is a woman increases. Moreover, a 
unit increase in the degree to which teachers believe that compensation corresponds to 
teacher performance still increases the probability of the teacher being positive to 
performance-related pay but not as much. This estimate is still significant on the 5 
percent level. The estimate for employment status shows that if the teacher is working 
full-time it decreases the probability of him/her being positive towards performance-
related pay with 32.6 percent.  
In model 3, the variables education and teacher experience were added. This 
makes the 𝑅2 increase to 0.459. The compensation appropriate estimate is slightly 
larger than in the two previous models but it is still significant on the 5 percent level 
and the monthly wage estimate is unchanged. Moreover, the variable education shows 
that a unit increase in education increases the probability of the respondent being 
positive toward performance-related pay with 103.9 percent and this result is 
significant on the 5 percent level. A unit increase in teacher experience however, has 
a negative impact on the probability of being positive to performance-related pay. 
This result is however, not significant. Moreover, if the respondent is a female the 
probability of being positive towards being compensated based on performance 
decreases with 26.1 percent and a unit increase in birth year decreases the probability 
of a person wanting performance-related pay with 0.3 percent.  
Generally, logit and probit models generate similar marginal effects; only if 
the sample is unbalanced the models give estimates that differ remarkably. The logit 
model was therefore used to see if the significant results in regression 2 were still 
significant if the logit model was used instead. Model 3 (regression 2) was regressed 
using the logit model and the results can be seen in table 12. 
 
Table 12: Results for when the logit model was used 
(standard errors of the estimates are reported in parenthesis) 
Dependent Variable Performance-related pay 
Independent variables  
Compensation appropriate  2.442** (1.056) 
Monthly wage −0.0006***(0.0002) 
Education 1.842** 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance levels 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively 
 
The estimates that were significant in regression 2 (Model 3) are significant 
regardless of if the probit or logit model was used. Although, the estimate of the 
variable compensation appropriate changed, it can still be assumed that the sample is 
balanced.  
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8.3 The teacher view on PISA  
 
In the survey, 51 teachers answered the final open question on their views on the poor 
student test scores in the 2012 PISA report. They were asked what they believe might 
be the reason for the declining student performance in Sweden. 16 percent of the 
teachers answered that it is due to lack of student motivation and the fact that students 
are not willing to put in the effort required to succeed in school. According to their 
opinion, students are not interested in learning and their concentration spans are too 
short. Furthermore, approximately 12 percent of the teachers answered that the 
weakened student test scores can be a result of a poor working environment for both 
students and teachers and that the schools’ educational resources have to increase in 
order to stimulate students. Another common answer to the survey question regarded 
teachers’ situation in Sweden where it was highlighted that teachers are exhausted and 
are paid low salaries (8%). Moreover, 8 percent of the respondents mentioned that 
school has lost its role in the society, as education is not considered to be important. 4 
percent answered that parents need to be more involved in the student’s learning 
process and 6 percent of the respondents mentioned that the Swedish schools focus 
not only on education but ethics and other knowledge that cannot be rated in grades 
(see Appendix 4 for more detailed answers). 
 
9. Discussion/Conclusion  
 
The decline in Swedish students test scores has lead to huge debates in Sweden about 
how to react to the negative trend. Teachers have a lot to say in this matter since they 
are in daily contact with the students. It is among students and teachers that we should 
start investigating the problem. In my study, I first present the background to why the 
research question was chosen. In the second part of the thesis I discuss the empirical 
and theoretical findings on how performance-related pay has affected teacher and 
student performance in the past. Moreover, the third part of the thesis consists of my 
original contribution where the data collection, method used and the survey results are 
discussed and evaluated. There are many possible explanations to the poor student test 
scores; but it cannot be denied that the low teacher salaries in Sweden might be one of 
them. The fact that teachers in Korea are the best paid and have the highest 
performing students supports this point (OECD, 2014). One possibility of improving 
the PISA results and the overall student performance could therefore be to change the 
ways in which teachers are compensated. In this study, I have chosen to turn to the 
teachers regarding their attitudes towards introducing performance-related pay in the 
teaching profession. In the past, performance-related pay has been introduced and its 
effect on student test scores has been studied. I think that it is the teachers’ 
willingness to be compensated based on performance that should be in focus. 
Therefore, I thought it would be of value to look at the teachers with the goal of 
answering the following question: What factors affect teachers’ willingness to be 
compensated based on performance? Since part of the questions in the survey 
revealed the teachers’ demographic characteristics, it was possible to investigate how 
the different factors affected the teachers’ willingness to being compensated based on 
performance and the level of job satisfaction in salary.  
After approximately 250 emails sent to teachers at both primary schools and 
high schools, 58 teachers decided to participate in the study. 64 percent of the 
participants were women and the age of the teachers ranged from 23 to 67 years. In 
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the study, it was found that approximately 67 percent of the respondents would be 
willing to be compensated based on performance and approximately 90 percent of the 
respondents do not believe that their wages correspond to the teaching activities that 
they do. It is clear that the teachers are not satisfied with the ways in which they are 
compensated.  
In the data analysis of job satisfaction in salary, women were found to be more 
dissatisfied with wages than men. One explanation to this could be that women to a 
greater extent are subject to wage discrimination than men. This is the only significant 
result for regression 1 and I find it surprising as I predicted monthly wage to have a 
significant impact on job satisfaction in salary. This because it is the variable that is in 
focus when job satisfaction in salary is rated.  
For regression 2, 3 independent variables had significant effects: a unit 
increase in the degree to which teachers believe that teacher compensation 
corresponds to teacher performance increases the probability of the teacher being 
positive to performance-related pay. The more the respondent believes that teacher 
compensation corresponds to teacher performance the more willing (s)he is to be 
compensated based on performance. This could be because if the respondent thinks 
that teacher compensation corresponds to teacher performance, (s)he is more likely to 
believe in a system that compensates teachers based on performance. Moreover, a unit 
increase in monthly wage (1 SEK) decreases the probability of a teacher being 
positive to performance-related pay. This might be because the teacher becomes more 
satisfied with the compensation received as the salary increases and does not find a 
change as necessary. It is also found that a unit increase in education increases the 
probability of the respondent being positive to performance-related pay. One 
explanation to this could be that teachers with higher formal education believe more 
in their own ability, and being compensated based on performance would therefore 
benefit them. 
Furthermore, women are found to be less willing to being compensated based 
on performance-related pay than men. Although this result is not significant, it is an 
interesting finding. The dissatisfaction in salary is greater among women than men 
but they are also less positive towards performance-related pay than men. Could this 
be because they have lost faith in the compensation system?  
  Moreover, when it comes to performance-related pay, economic theory and 
actual practice sometimes seems inconsistent (Fryer, 2011, Lazear, 2000). The 
challenge to economists is to provide explanations to why the models in Personnel 
Economics sometimes do not correspond with reality. I believe that it is because 
people are different, react differently to incentives and are motivated by different 
things. In economic theory, workers are viewed as a group with identical opinions. 
This means that when introducing performance-related pay in the workplace a clash 
arises. We have to look at people as individuals and acquire knowledge about the 
teachers who would be willing to be compensated based on performance.  
In conclusion, as the majority of the teachers who participated in the study 
seem to be willing to be compensated based on performance, it might be worth trying 
to impose it, but on what premises can be discussed. Fryer et al. (2012) performed the 
first field experiment of teacher incentives where loss aversion is taken into account 
and finds evidence that framing teacher financial incentive programs in terms of 
losses instead of gains improve student achievement. Since several studies have 
shown that the introduction of performance-related pay has no significant impact on 
student performance it might be worth considering framing the incentive-programs in 
terms of losses.  
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In times of downward trends in student performance it is important to examine 
what the people in the school system consider to be the causes of it to get a deeper 
understanding of the problem. After this study, one has a greater understanding of the 
Swedish teachers’ views on the teaching profession: the majority of the teachers are 
not very satisfied with the salary they receive and are willing to be compensated 
based on performance and only 10 percent of the teachers believe that teacher 
compensation corresponds to teacher activity. While female teachers are on average 
less satisfied with wages than men they are also less positive to the idea of being 
compensated based on performance. This tells us that performance-related pay might 
not be the best way of solving the situation for the teachers that are dissatisfied. 
Therefore, before a change in the ways in which teachers are compensated can be 
implemented, the teachers’ views on it have to be investigated further. However, after 
this study it can at least be concluded that the majority of the teachers that participated 
in the survey seem open to the idea of performance-related pay and that is a good 
starting point.  
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11. Appendices:  
 
11.1 Appendix 1 Consent form 
 
Dear teacher, 
My name is Sofia Bramstång, I am a student at Lund University and I am currently 
writing my bachelor dissertation in economics. You are being contacted about 
participating in a research study that will examine the relationship between teacher 
variables, teacher compensation and job satisfaction. This study is aimed at teachers 
and the purpose is to find out about teachers’ attitudes towards performance-related 
pay. I understand how valuable time is for educators and would truly appreciate any 
time you could offer in support of this study.  
The Department of Economics at Lund University School of Economics and 
Management has approved the study and participation is voluntary. It will not be 
possible, at any stage of the study, to identify the teacher or the school participating.  
If you choose to participate, you will complete a short survey about yourself and your 
current school that will take about 10 minutes to complete. The information gathered 
will remain confidential. No teacher or school names will be used in reporting results, 
when filling in the questionnaire, we will not ask for your name or any information 
which will make you identifiable. Only my dissertation advisor and I will have access 
to the data. 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. Your professional assistance is truly 
appreciated. If you have any questions about this study, please contact me at 
sbramstang@gmail.com. You may contact my advisor Natalia Montinari at 
natalia.montinari@nek.lu.se too.  
By clicking on the following link and completing the attached survey, you agree to be 
a participant in this research study.  
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/18RAqGrIrYPCVKtLwfkGOgkoCTDf5nw-
5jNvrRi-paEY/viewform?usp=send_form 
Also, I would appreciate if you could send this link to other teachers who according to 
you would be suitable participants of the study. If you rather wish to answer these 
survey questions on hard copy it could be arranged, and we will find some way to 
collect the answers.  
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We would really appreciate if you could respond to the survey within a week.  
Sincerely, 
Sofia Bramstång 
11.2 Appendix 2 Survey 
 
In the survey below, questions 17, 18 and 19 are taken from the Teacher 
Questionnaire and question 20 is taken from the Job Satisfaction Questionnaire. 
 
Survey 
 
Confidentiality All information that is collected in this study will be treated 
confidentially. While results will be made available using grouping criteria (e.g. more 
experienced vs. less experienced teachers) you are guaranteed that neither you, your 
school, nor any of its personnel will be identified in any report of the results of the 
study. Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
 
Personal information 
 
1. What is your gender?  
a. Female 
b. Male 
 
2. What is your year of birth? 
_____________  
 
3. What is your place of birth? 
City_________, Country_________ 
 
4. What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed?  
a. Gymnasium/High School  
b. Bachelor 
c. Masters 
d. PhD 
 
5. What year did you complete your last degree? 
__________________ 
 
6. For how many years have you been working as a teacher?  
_________________ 
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7. Consider your situation in the current year. In how many schools do you 
work? 
Please indicate, for each school, the level of school (e.g. primary school, high 
school, etc.) the location, whether it is private or public and how many hours 
per week you work at each school. 
a. School 1: Level_________________ 
i. Location ___________  
ii. Public___ Private____   
iii. Hours per week _____ 
 
b. School 2: Level__________________ 
i. Location ___________ 
ii. Public___ Private____   
iii. Hours per week _____ 
 
c. School 3: Level_________________ 
i. Location ___________ 
ii. Public___ Private____   
iii. Hours per week _____ 
In questions 8-16 we ask you about your teaching activities and about the school 
where you teach. When answering the following questions, if you teach in more than 
one school, please consider your current situation and the school where you teach the 
most hours per week. 
8. How long have you been working as a teacher at the school where you are 
presently employed? 
_________________ 
 
9. What is your employment status as a teacher?  
a. Part-time 
b. Full-time 
 
10. What kind of contract do you have?  
a. On-going contract 
b. Fixed term contract 
 
11. How many classes do you teach per week?  
Please indicate the grade for each class. 
Class 1, grade:_____  
Class 2, grade:_____  
Class 3, grade:_____  
Class 4, grade:_____  
Class 5, grade:_____ 
  
12. What subject(s) do you teach?  
a. Subject 1: _________________ hours per week_________ 
b. Subject 2: _________________ hours per week_________ 
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c. Subject 3: _________________ hours per week_______ 
 
13. How many students are in the classes where you are teaching? 
a. Class 1: number of students_______ grade___________ 
b. Class 2: number of students_______ grade ___________ 
c. Class 3: number of students_______ grade ___________ 
d. Class 4: number of students_______ grade ___________ 
e. Class 5: number of students_______ grade ___________ 
 
14. What is your estimate of the level of school achievement? 
a. High (100% - 90% of students are at, or above grade level) 
b. Middle (89% - 70% of students are at, or above grade level) 
c. Low (69% or less of students are at, or below grade level) 
 
15. How would you categorize your school’s overall performance level? 
a. Low-performing school 
b. Average performing school 
c. High-performing school 
 
 
16. What is your estimate of the percentage of the following ethnic groups at 
your school?  Please indicate your estimated percentage (Low, Middle, or 
High) for your school. 
 
 Low (25% or less) 
 
Middle (26% - 
59%) 
 
High (60% - 
100%) 
Swedish    
Other European    
African-American    
Hispanic-Latino    
Middle east    
Chinese    
Other    
 
 
In questions 17-19 we would like to ask you about the appraisal (defined below) of 
your work as a teacher and the feedback (defined below) you receive about your work 
in the school where you teach most hours per week. In regard to the questions before, 
if you teach in more than one school, when answering the following questions, please 
consider your current situation and the school where you teach most of the hours per 
week.  
 
In this survey, Appraisal is defined as when a teacher’s work is reviewed by the 
principal, an external inspector or by his or her colleagues. This appraisal can be 
conducted in a range of ways from a more formal, objective approach (e.g. as part of 
a formal performance management system, involving set procedures and criteria) to 
the more informal, more subjective approach (e.g. through informal discussions with 
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the teacher). 
 
In this survey, Feedback is defined as a review of a teacher’s work, often with the 
purpose of noting good performance or identifying areas of development. The 
feedback may be provided formally (e.g. through a written report) or informally (e.g. 
through discussions with the teacher). 
17. How often do you receive appraisal and/or feedback about your work as a 
teacher?  Please indicate the frequency of appraisals/or feedback (weekly, 
monthly, annually etc.) below. 
a. From principal: _______________________________ 
b. From other teachers: ___________________________ 
c. From parents: _________________________________ 
 
18. In your opinion, how important were the following aspects considered to 
be when you received this appraisal and/or feedback? 
a. Student test scores: _______________________________ 
b. Pass rates of students: _____________________________ 
c. Feedback from parents: ____________________________ 
d. How well you work with the principal and your colleagues: 
_______________ 
e. Classroom teaching: ___________________________ 
f. Knowledge and understanding of your subject: 
_______________________ 
g. Relations with students: _______________________________ 
 
19. Concerning the appraisal and/or feedback you have received at this 
school, have they directly led to any of the following? 
a. A change in salary? _______________________________ 
b. A financial bonus or monetary reward? ___________________________ 
c. A symbolic recognition (e.g. best teacher of the year)_________________ 
d. A change in likelihood of career advancement? _____________________ 
e. Change in work responsibility? _______________________________ 
In question 20 we ask you about your level of job satisfaction. Using the scale shown 
below, please rate your level of satisfaction with the following aspects of your job. As 
for the questions before, if you teach in more than one school, when answering the 
following question, please consider your current situation and the school where you 
teach most of the hours per week.  
 
20. Job satisfaction  
1 
not satisfied 
at all 
2 3 
 
4 5 
extremely 
satisfied 
  
 
20. 1) General working conditions 
_____ Hours worked each week 
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_____ Flexibility in scheduling 
_____ Location of work 
20. 2) Pay and promotion potential  
_____ Salary 
_____ Opportunities for Promotion 
_____ Benefits (Health insurance, life insurance, etc.) 
_____ Job Security 
_____ Recognition for work accomplished 
 
20. 3) Work relationship 
_____ Relationships with your co-workers 
_____ Relationship(s) with your supervisor(s) 
 
20. 4) Use of skills and ability 
_____ Opportunity to utilize your skills and talents 
_____ Opportunity to learn new skills 
_____ Support for additional training and education 
 
20. 5) Work activities  
_____ Variety of job responsibilities 
_____ Degree of independence associated with your work roles 
 
 
In answering questions 21-23 we ask you to think of your overall teaching activity (if 
you teach at more than one school, you should consider all of them) 
 
21. Which is your monthly wage after tax from your teaching activities? 
 
_________________ 
 
22. Do you think that your salary is appropriate given the teaching activity 
that you do? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
23. Do you think that being compensated partially through performance-
related pay would be a positive change? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Finally, we would like to ask you about your opinion about the following 
statements. Please choose only one alternative for each of the following 
questions.  
 
24.  Teacher compensation corresponds to teacher performance in Sweden  
a. strongly disagree 
b. disagree 
c. agree 
d. strongly agree 
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25. If teacher compensation would increase I would put more effort into my 
job 
a. strongly disagree 
b. disagree 
c. agree 
d. strongly agree 
 
26. There is a correlation between teacher compensation and student 
achievement 
a. strongly disagree 
b. disagree 
c. agree 
d. strongly agree 
 
 
27. In teaching, non-financial motivation is stronger than financial 
motivation  
a. strongly disagree 
b. disagree 
c. agree 
d. strongly agree 
 
28. Increasing teacher wages would improve teacher quality 
a. strongly disagree 
b. disagree 
c. agree 
d. strongly agree 
 
29. I would be more motivated to teach if teacher compensation was to 
increase 
a. strongly disagree 
a. disagree 
b. agree 
c. strongly agree 
 
30. Who sent you the invitation to participate in the study? 
_____________ 
 
What is your view on the poor student test scores of Swedish students in the 2012 
PISA report? What do you think might be the reasons for the declining student 
results? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.3 Appendix 3 Summary statistics 
 
Table 11 Summary statistics  
Variable                                                      Obs    Mean        Std. Dev     Min      Max  
Birth year                                                      57      1969.175    13.692      1947     1991              
Year when last degree was completed         57     1997.456    13.769       1971      2013 
Teacher experience                                       51       16.784      12.926         1            44 
Years spent working at current school         51        9.471        9.023           1           38 
Number of classes that teacher teaches        51        4.980        4.407           1           18 
Job satisfaction work hours                          57      3.947          0.854           2            5                 
Job satisfaction scheduling                           57      2.912         1.106            1            5 
Job satisfaction location of work                  56      4.143         0.999            1            5 
Job satisfaction salary                                   57      2.193         1.025            1            5                
Job satisfaction promotion                            56      2.071         0.871            1            4 
Job satisfaction benefits                                57      2.439         1.165            1            5 
Job satisfaction job security                          56      3.429         0.988            1            5 
Job satisfaction recognition                           57      2.737         1.094            1            5 
Job satisfaction co-workers                           57      3.947         0.854            2            5 
Job satisfaction supervisor(s)                        56      3.339         0.940            1            5 
Job satisfaction use skills                              57      3.649         0.896            2            5 
Job satisfaction learn new skills                   57       3.211         1.031            1            5 
Job satisfaction support                                57       2.772         1.018            1            5 
Job satisfaction variety in job                       57       3.246         0.969            1            5 
Job satisfaction independency                      56       3.482         0.934            2            5 
Monthly wage                                                54     19965.74   4409.401    6000   30300           
Performance-related pay                                57      0.737          0.444           0          1                
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11.4 Appendix 4 Open question on the 2012 PISA results 
 
Table 13 The respondents thoughts on the 2012 PISA results 
What is your view on the poor student test scores of Swedish students in the 2012 
PISA report? What do you think might be the reasons for the declining student 
results? 
1. Teachers are not motivated enough to put in the extra effort. I think that it is sad. 
Declining motivation among teachers and students. 
2. Declining student motivation, lack of support and decreasing recourses. 
3. Not interested in the PISA report. I prefer a relaxed high school atmosphere instead 
of test score-related. 
4. Students, parents and the overall attitude towards education and effort. 
5. Couldn't care less about the PISA results. The PISA tests are quasi tests measuring 
what the neo-liberals want to measure. 
6. I think there are several, interesting reasons. Children in Sweden are raised and 
taught to make there own decisions following their hearts, not to obey authorities or 
adapt to requirements formulated by somebody else. I honestly believe that children 
are surprised when they realize that they have to work pretty hard with seemingly 
boring assignments. Their emotional response screams ""boring"" and then they 
choose not to do it, just as they are taught. Another reason, I believe, is that the 
concentration span is shorter than it used to be. * 
7. Exhausted teachers. 
8. The students get to decide to much in school. 
9. Low compensation and lack of appraisals and feedback don't attract top performing 
teachers. Poor work environment for both students and teachers affect the results 
negatively. 
10. Wages are too low = being a teacher doesn't attract gifted young people. Instead, 
the good students with really high grades choose to pursue a career within business, 
law, medicine, technology etc. Only those with low grades become teachers today. * 
11. I think one of the reasons why they were that bad is the fact that students do not 
feel the need to be good any more, they have a different view of school now. * 
12. I'm not familiar with it. 
13. One reason I think is the numbers of pupils in the classroom and lack of adults. To 
be able to learn you need to feel safe and comfortable with your friends.  You need a 
good relation to the teacher otherwise it will be hard if not impossible to learn. * 
14. Swedish schools try new student learning methods too easily without knowing if 
they have worked in the past. 
15. The school does not stimulate the students enough mentally. More money should 
be spent on educational resources. * 
16. The methods used for learning are not effective. 
17. Lack of motivation among students and teachers. Teachers get paid poorly and 
students don't seem to understand why school is important. 
18. The schools’ resources aren't enough. Students are more interested in their 
smartphones. 
19. Pisa only measures certain skills. I don't think Swedish students are that behind in 
comparison to other countries. 
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20. Students are more interested in what they want to do on their free time. 
21. Students are distracted by the technical advancement. * 
22. Spoiled and dependent on their phones. 
23. Too much pressure on students, which leads to that they don't do anything at all. 
24. Lack of motivation. 
25. Focus on subjects and things that aren't tested on the PISA test. 
26. I don't know. 
27. Spoiled students. * 
28. The fact that learning and teaching are viewed as useless occupations in Sweden. 
29. Parents need to be more involved in the student’s learning process and support 
homework. * 
30. We focus not only on education but ethics and other knowledge that can't be rated 
in grades. 
31. The class sizes are too big. * 
32. The school needs to gain trust from the society and parents need to take bigger 
responsibility when it comes to raising their children to be respectful and ambitious. * 
33. Teacher education programs are too broad and shallow. *  
34. The test scores are depressing. 
35. There are far too many distractions for young people in today’s society. * 
36. The classic way of teaching is considered to be old-fashioned.  
37. Low teacher salaries; the job has lost its status. * 
38. Too much responsibility is put on the school and the teachers. * 
39. Students and teachers are not motivated enough 
40. Exhausted teachers and lazy students 
41.  When the teacher salary is low the most advanced students don’t turn to teaching. 
* 
42. Laziness 
43. The market liberal school system gives people the opportunity to make profits on 
tax money. * 
44. The teacher training is of low standard. * 
45. Many of the new teachers are not prepared for the heavy workload. * 
46. Stress, low pay and low status could be some of the reasons. * 
47. Students lack motivation and their reading skills are not good. * 
48. The fact that the number of students with problems including autism, ADHD and 
dyslexia has increased very much could be reasons for the declining test scores. * 
49. I find that the Swedish trained teachers are lazy and poorly informed on how to 
develop efficient lessons and appropriate relationships with students and parents. * 
50. It is my firm belief that until the Swedish system realizes that its approach to 
pedagogics and teacher-student relationships must change PISA test scores will 
continue to be low.  There is a fundamental problem with how students and teachers 
interact with each other and the expectations on teachers are too high. * 
51. The technological activity 
Note: The asterisks next to the respondents’ answers indicate that the answers have been corrected to 
become more understandable.   
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